Permit me to wade in on both of David's comments and Mark's initial input. Getting the mandate right is like getting the re-entry angle right on Apollo capsules return from the moon: too shallow and they'd skip off into space; too deep and they'd burn up. And they couldn't be steered once re-entry started. Peacemaking and peace accords set the initial "re-entry angle" for peace implementation: too shallow and the polity doesn't recover (Haiti 1994+); too deep and the commitment may burn out (Somalia then, perhaps Afghanistan now). As I tell my students, the international community has the resources for many shallow or a few deep interventions but not both and not in big places. Unlike Apollo, mandates can be steered, but ultimate results may be above their pay grade. Thus, MONUC in DRC evolved from protected observation into a big, violent holding action but its problems will not be solved by whatever the mission might do, even with different nationalities in its troop makeup, because the fundamental problem is higher-grade, in the political leadership decisions of Congo, the surrounding states, and those in Congo who periodically serve as their proxies. The "weight to do right" must be felt in those capitals. Darfur is not even, as yet, a holding action, its fate tied more closely to politics in Khartoum than to whatever peacekeepers might manage to do in the field.
Regarding David's note on the novelty of developed state participation in complex UN ops: it was norm for a few years after the Cold War, with large Western contingents in UNPROFOR (Bosnia -- Britain, France, Spain, the Netherlands, and the Nordics) and UNOSOM II (Somalia -- US, France, Italy, Australia, Belgium). Plus Rwanda (Belgium again). Since then, command and control complaints have been the excuse for non-participation in UN ops but Western hands were all over the control levers in Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda. But the issue of whether UN C2 has improved enough in 15 years is mooted by western commitments of troops under other flags (NATO, EU).
Permit me to wade in on both of David's comments and Mark's initial input. Getting the mandate right is like getting the re-entry angle right on Apollo capsules return from the moon: too shallow and they'd skip off into space; too deep and they'd burn up. And they couldn't be steered once re-entry started. Peacemaking and peace accords set the initial "re-entry angle" for peace implementation: too shallow and the polity doesn't recover (Haiti 1994+); too deep and the commitment may burn out (Somalia then, perhaps Afghanistan now). As I tell my students, the international community has the resources for many shallow or a few deep interventions but not both and not in big places. Unlike Apollo, mandates can be steered, but ultimate results may be above their pay grade. Thus, MONUC in DRC evolved from protected observation into a big, violent holding action but its problems will not be solved by whatever the mission might do, even with different nationalities in its troop makeup, because the fundamental problem is higher-grade, in the political leadership decisions of Congo, the surrounding states, and those in Congo who periodically serve as their proxies. The "weight to do right" must be felt in those capitals. Darfur is not even, as yet, a holding action, its fate tied more closely to politics in Khartoum than to whatever peacekeepers might manage to do in the field.
Regarding David's note on the novelty of developed state participation in complex UN ops: it was norm for a few years after the Cold War, with large Western contingents in UNPROFOR (Bosnia -- Britain, France, Spain, the Netherlands, and the Nordics) and UNOSOM II (Somalia -- US, France, Italy, Australia, Belgium). Plus Rwanda (Belgium again). Since then, command and control complaints have been the excuse for non-participation in UN ops but Western hands were all over the control levers in Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda. But the issue of whether UN C2 has improved enough in 15 years is mooted by western commitments of troops under other flags (NATO, EU).
I agree with Mark that the gap between the Security Council's mandates and what is achievable on the ground has often been startling. In part, this is just hope prevailing over good sense. But it also reflects a deeper reality: when the Security Council authorizes a mission, it may actually be less concerned with the situation on the ground than it is with the political effect of the action at home or vis-a-vis other Council states. This points to an important political role that peacekeeping missions can play: providing political cover for the Great Powers. Historically, peacekeeping evolved in this way and, in a sense, little has changed. The early observer missions to Palestine and then the larger Suez mission in 1956 were explicitly designed to help major powers out of tight spots. Having small states provide troops made sure that the peacekeeping forces didn't themselves become triggers for great power conflict. Obviously, there have been exceptions to the rule that peacekeeping contributors should be small states and "middle powers." (The British have contributed large numbers of troops to several missions, including Cyprus and Bosnia.)
It's important to keep this context in mind, however. In the larger geopolitical game, peacekeeping forces have been buffers between the major powers. Bill Durch suggests that the major powers -- or at least more developed states -- should start providing manpower for the missions. I think he may be right. But we should acknowledge that this would be a significant conceptual shift and that it might involve political complications. The danger of great power conflagration is much reduced, though it will obviously be prudent to keep certain great powers out of certain regions. China has shown increased interest in peacekeeping, and there was grumbling by human rights activists about the participation of Chinese personnel (mainly engineers) in Sudan. The great powers have troops, but they also bring some heavy political baggage.
I agree with Mark that the gap between the Security Council's mandates and what is achievable on the ground has often been startling. In part, this is just hope prevailing over good sense. But it also reflects a deeper reality: when the Security Council authorizes a mission, it may actually be less concerned with the situation on the ground than it is with the political effect of the action at home or vis-a-vis other Council states. This points to an important political role that peacekeeping missions can play: providing political cover for the Great Powers. Historically, peacekeeping evolved in this way and, in a sense, little has changed. The early observer missions to Palestine and then the larger Suez mission in 1956 were explicitly designed to help major powers out of tight spots. Having small states provide troops made sure that the peacekeeping forces didn't themselves become triggers for great power conflict. Obviously, there have been exceptions to the rule that peacekeeping contributors should be small states and "middle powers." (The British have contributed large numbers of troops to several missions, including Cyprus and Bosnia.)
It's important to keep this context in mind, however. In the larger geopolitical game, peacekeeping forces have been buffers between the major powers. Bill Durch suggests that the major powers -- or at least more developed states -- should start providing manpower for the missions. I think he may be right. But we should acknowledge that this would be a significant conceptual shift and that it might involve political complications. The danger of great power conflagration is much reduced, though it will obviously be prudent to keep certain great powers out of certain regions. China has shown increased interest in peacekeeping, and there was grumbling by human rights activists about the participation of Chinese personnel (mainly engineers) in Sudan. The great powers have troops, but they also bring some heavy political baggage.
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>>U.S. - Authorities announced yesterday that they had arrested Ben-Ami Kadish, a former U.S. army engineer, on charges of supplying classified documents to Israel, including information on nuclear weaponry, the F-15 fighter jet, and the Patriot missile defense system. The hand-off allegedly occurred at the army weapons research center in Dover, Del., where Kadish worked from 1979 to 1985. His handler is said to be the same who worked with Jonathan Pollard.
>>Australia - The Olympic torch has arrived in Australia, which has enacted "unprecedented" security measures to keep protesters at bay. The torch was immediately whisked to an undisclosed location and will be guarded by hundreds of police along its 10-mile relay route. Pro-Tibet demonstrators have already beamed a laser sign onto the Sydney Harbour Bridge reading "Don't Torch Tibet," and a group of Tibetan exiles on hunger strike just completed a nearly 50-mile march to Canberra, where they are now involved in a candle-light vigil outside the Chinese embassy.
>>Zimbabwe - China may give up on a shipment of arms to Zimbabwe, due to protests across southern Africa, which have kept the ship from docking at a suitable port. South Africa's supreme court ruled last Friday that the arms could not be transported from Durban, the ship's original destination, to Zimbabwe, after an Anglican bishop argued that they would likely be used to crush the opposition. South Africa's dock workers union also said they would refuse to unload the shipment. President Mwanawasa of Zambia, head of the Southern African Development Community, called on other southern Africa nations to deny the ship harbor. It is currently idling off the east coast of southern Africa.
Yesterday in UN Dispatch
Top Stories
>>U.S. - Authorities announced yesterday that they had arrested Ben-Ami Kadish, a former U.S. army engineer, on charges of supplying classified documents to Israel, including information on nuclear weaponry, the F-15 fighter jet, and the Patriot missile defense system. The hand-off allegedly occurred at the army weapons research center in Dover, Del., where Kadish worked from 1979 to 1985. His handler is said to be the same who worked with Jonathan Pollard.
>>Australia - The Olympic torch has arrived in Australia, which has enacted "unprecedented" security measures to keep protesters at bay. The torch was immediately whisked to an undisclosed location and will be guarded by hundreds of police along its 10-mile relay route. Pro-Tibet demonstrators have already beamed a laser sign onto the Sydney Harbour Bridge reading "Don't Torch Tibet," and a group of Tibetan exiles on hunger strike just completed a nearly 50-mile march to Canberra, where they are now involved in a candle-light vigil outside the Chinese embassy.
>>Zimbabwe - China may give up on a shipment of arms to Zimbabwe, due to protests across southern Africa, which have kept the ship from docking at a suitable port. South Africa's supreme court ruled last Friday that the arms could not be transported from Durban, the ship's original destination, to Zimbabwe, after an Anglican bishop argued that they would likely be used to crush the opposition. South Africa's dock workers union also said they would refuse to unload the shipment. President Mwanawasa of Zambia, head of the Southern African Development Community, called on other southern Africa nations to deny the ship harbor. It is currently idling off the east coast of southern Africa.
Yesterday in UN Dispatch
David Bosco raises a legitimate concern about "bang for the buck". However, it is very difficult to measure results with any degree of accuracy when mission mandates are increasingly broad and often patently-over ambitious. I'd like to turn the question around, and ask if mandating authorities (like the UN, EU and AU) are not expecting way too much of peacekeeping -- regardless of the financial costs?
For example, UN Secretariat officials repeatedly warned of the overwhelming obstacles to deployment to Darfur, but their warnings went unheeded by a Security Council that mandated 26,000 uniformed peacekeepers for the mission -- with one of the main mandate elements being implementation of the defunct Darfur Peace Agreement.
The African Union Mission in Somalia managed to deploy only a quarter of its authorized strength of 8,000 due to a combination of logistical constraints, financial shortfalls, and a lack of peace to keep. With only 2,000 AU troops in Somalia and only 9,000 in Darfur, in March 2008 the UN Security Council was seriously debating the notion of deploying 28,000 UN troops to Somalia.
The widening gap between aspirations and the implementation of successful peace operations is very evident. The multi-billion dollar question is: How do we close this gap? By simply saying "enough" and retreating from the peacekeeping enterprise, as happened in the mid '90s after the last big peak in global peace operations and some nasty experiences in the Balkans and Africa? By trying to expand the available means with the likes of the US-sponsored Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), which aims to train a total of 75,000 peacekeeping troops -- mostly Africans -- by the year 2010? By commissioning another expert panel, like the one led by Lakhdar Brahimi in 2000 which produced very substantive recommendations on how to get the operational mechanics of UN peace operations right? Or by taking a really hard look at the mandate end and the peacemaking processes that precede the crafting of seemingly impossible mission mandates?
David Bosco raises a legitimate concern about "bang for the buck". However, it is very difficult to measure results with any degree of accuracy when mission mandates are increasingly broad and often patently-over ambitious. I'd like to turn the question around, and ask if mandating authorities (like the UN, EU and AU) are not expecting way too much of peacekeeping -- regardless of the financial costs?
For example, UN Secretariat officials repeatedly warned of the overwhelming obstacles to deployment to Darfur, but their warnings went unheeded by a Security Council that mandated 26,000 uniformed peacekeepers for the mission -- with one of the main mandate elements being implementation of the defunct Darfur Peace Agreement.
The African Union Mission in Somalia managed to deploy only a quarter of its authorized strength of 8,000 due to a combination of logistical constraints, financial shortfalls, and a lack of peace to keep. With only 2,000 AU troops in Somalia and only 9,000 in Darfur, in March 2008 the UN Security Council was seriously debating the notion of deploying 28,000 UN troops to Somalia.
The widening gap between aspirations and the implementation of successful peace operations is very evident. The multi-billion dollar question is: How do we close this gap? By simply saying "enough" and retreating from the peacekeeping enterprise, as happened in the mid '90s after the last big peak in global peace operations and some nasty experiences in the Balkans and Africa? By trying to expand the available means with the likes of the US-sponsored Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), which aims to train a total of 75,000 peacekeeping troops -- mostly Africans -- by the year 2010? By commissioning another expert panel, like the one led by Lakhdar Brahimi in 2000 which produced very substantive recommendations on how to get the operational mechanics of UN peace operations right? Or by taking a really hard look at the mandate end and the peacemaking processes that precede the crafting of seemingly impossible mission mandates?
Top Stories
>>Georgia - Yesterday Georgia accused Russia of violating its airspace with a MIG jet to shoot down a reconnaissance drone over Abkhazia. Russia denied the claim, saying that the drone violated UN ceasefire resolutions and was shot down by separatists. Georgia has video. Last week, Russia expanded relations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, ratcheting up tensions. >>Sudan - A census that is seen as an integral step toward holding democratic elections in 2009 has begun in Khartoum. The census will also help determine the distribution of Sudan's oil revenues. Many in the south and in Darfur fear that the massive amounts of internal displacement will skew the results; insecurity will as well. President al-Bashir was the first counted. The United Nations is assisting Sudan's government with this process.
>>Hamas - In a speech in Jerusalem capping his controversial nine-day visit, Jimmy Carter said that Hamas is willing to accept Israel's right to exist as a "neighbor, next door, in peace" if a peace deal is accepted by Palestinians. They also said that they would allow kidnapped Israeli soldier Gilad Shilat to send a letter to his parents and accept an interim ceasefire in Gaza. Israeli officials expressed doubt about Carter's ability to follow through on the agreements and called his meeting with top Hamas officials "a disgrace."
Yesterday in UN Dispatch