Africa

When I cited international reports that had laid eyes on the cargo manifest of the Ukrainian ship hijacked by pirates en route to Kenya South Sudan, I was confident that the documentation told the whole story. However, the Kenyan government -- which obviously does not want to be seen as undermining a peace between North and South Sudan that it helped mediate -- seems to have staked its defense on the meaning of four little letters on this potentially damning piece of evidence. The Economist raises this possibility that I had not considered:

Much will turn on the real meaning of the acronym GOSS, evident as the buyer on the manifest. Most people take this to mean the Government of South Sudan, meaning that the tanks were destined for that region. The Kenyans say it means the Kenyan army's own General Ordinance Supplies and Security, proving that the tanks were going to Kenya.

My guess is that the tanks were in fact headed to Sudan -- yet it does seem amazingly coincidental that the Kenyan army does in fact have an organization with the initials GOSS. We can be sure, though, that the pirates currently holding onto the cargo were not intended to be the ultimate recipients.

While the Dow's dip below 10,000 certainly does not bode well for investors, its significance is largely symbolic. Contrast this with the every-day impact felt by the millions of people at the forefront of an even more sobering milestone:

The number of urban slum-dwellers worldwide has broken the one billion mark, making it clear that the urbanization of poverty is arguably one of the biggest challenges facing development today, executive director of UN-Habitat, has said.

According to the UN Secretary-General, over a third of urban dwellers in the developing world live in slums. This problem is even more acute in sub-Saharan Africa, where breakneck urbanization has created slums that contain more than 60% of cities' inhabitants. The S-G cited these statistics in his message on "World Habitat Day" yesterday, which marked an occasion to "reflect on the state of our towns and cities and the basic right to adequate shelter for all." It also signals how far we have to go if we are to meet the Millennium Development Goals' challenge of improving at least 100 million slum dwellers' lives by 2020. Sign up here to Stand Up against poverty and in support of the MDGs.

Certain aspects of the saga of the weapon-laden Ukrainian ship hijacked by pirates two weeks ago never seemed quite right, as articulated here by The New York Times' Jeffrey Gettleman:

Why was the ship left unguarded in some of the most dangerous waters in the world, given its cargo of 33 tanks, 150 grenade launchers, 6 antiaircraft guns and heaps of ammunition? Why does Kenya, known for its wild animals, not its wars, need so many tanks? And if it does need tanks, why suddenly switch from British armor, which it has used for decades, to incompatible Eastern-bloc equipment?

The BBC now seems to have uncovered some hard evidence to answer these questions:

A copy of the freight manifest appears to show contracts for the hardware were made by the Kenyan Ministry of Defence on behalf of South Sudan's government.

Uh-oh. This is bad P.R. for Kenya (perhaps it needs a spokesman more like the pirates'), but it is worse news for Sudan, where an "arms race" between North and South would be a bad sign in the run-up to next year's important national elections.

The Times' intrepid Africa reporter Jeffrey Gettleman plays tourist in Eritrea for a guest spot on Sunday's travel section. The picture he paints of Eritrea's architectural wonders makes the capital, Asmara, sound like an intriguing place to visit. There is almost no crime, the climate is near perfect, and the Italian-influenced cuisine sounds delectable. It recalls, the title of his article suggests, La Dolce Vita. Gettleman does include a "hefty caveat" for potential American tourists. (And, it should be noted, the Eritrean-American relationship took another turn for the worse today when the United States banned arms sales to Eritrea over accusations that the government in Asmara is arming Islamist Somali insurgents. As Gettleman says:

American-Eritrean relations are at a historic low point, with American officials accusing the Eritrean government of sponsoring terrorism in Somalia. It's a long story, having to do with the chaos in Somalia and the poisonous relationship between Eritrea and its much larger neighbor, Ethiopia, which happens to be America's new B.F.F. (best friend forever) in Africa and is currently occupying Somalia. The Eritreans paint themselves as victims of a Western conspiracy.

UN officials and peacekeepers might also think twice before visiting as the government is not very hospitable to their kind. Last spring the United Nations Mission to Ethiopia-Eritrea (UNMEE) was forced to shut down after Asmara effectively withdrew its consent for the mission. More recently, the Eritrean government refused to meet with UN investigators on a fact-finding mission to the site of a clash between Eritrean and Djibouti armed forces. Joking aside, I don't doubt that Asmara is a nice place to visit. I just wish the Eritrean government behave more cooperatively toward the United Nations.

In a report on the emptying of half of Somalia's capital -- perhaps 500,000 of its million or so inhabitants have fled fighting between al-Shabab militants and Ethiopian forces -- the BBC includes this poignant quote from the commander of the beleaguered African Union mission in the country:

"I need more troops, I need more equipment," he said, repeating the common refrain of peacekeeping commanders. But the diplomat-general was wise enough to add: "I also need more political support, I need more diplomatic support. You cannot impose a solution on Somalis, you can only encourage peace".

This is "common refrain" for a reason, of course. No one can appreciate more than the commanders on the ground the desperate equipment shortages that peacekeepers face. Yet the fact that this "diplomat-general" recognizes that political and diplomatic investment is equally important attests to the fact that the conflict in Somalia, like any other, can only be solved with pen and paper in negotiations, not with guns and tanks on the streets of Mogadishu.

The saga of the Somali swashbucklers is all the rage in the blogosphere.

Passport's Elizabeth Dickinson -- who, coincidentally enough, wrote her undergraduate thesis on the topic -- explains the origins of these "medieval-sounding avengers." Chris Blattman coins a great new term, calling the pirates' latest antics it a pi-jacking (pirate hijacking). Adam Blickstein at Democracy Arsenal channels Steve Zissou and reminds us that "well, out here we call them 'pirates,' Ned." And Robert Kaplan, writing in The Current, notes how combating piracy could end up strengthening international cooperation.

The one upside of piracy is that it creates incentives for cooperation among navies of countries who often have tense relations with each other. The U.S. and the Russians cooperate off the Gulf of Aden, and we might begin to work with the Chinese and other navies off the coast of Indonesia, too. As a transnational threat tied to anarchy, piracy brings nations together, helping to form the new coalitions of the 21st century.

Kaplan is right on the mark (and it's a point I alluded to earlier), but I worry that he is being a little too sanguine about American and Russian cooperation. A Russian ship is en route to join the five American destroyers circling the pirates right now, and, according to Jeffrey Gettleman's latest dispatch, Russian and American anti-piracy tactics don't always, shall we say, see prow to prow. Recent tensions between the two countries don't make the situation any easier, and Somali officials seem to be eager to exploit these tensions. If the possibility of a nuclear stand-off weren't enough to cool Russian and American heels, then, perhaps this gang of sea bandits will do the trick. (Image from flickr user AkumAPRIME using a creative commons license)

In addition to their Huff Post piece on a new China-Darfur strategy, the prodigious folks over at the ENOUGH project today also released a statement on the faltering peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo's increasingly volatile eastern region. According to their analysis, the Congolese government has basically fallen flat on its political commitments to negotiate with the rebel National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP). Instead, the authors argue, Kinshasa has attempted to sideline the CNDP, while -- to compensate for its military weakness -- inappropriately relying on the UN peacekeeping mission in the country, MONUC, to mount offensives against CNDP and other armed elements. The CNDP has not been blameless, of course, and tensions threaten to erupt into full-scale war. Trapped in the middle are the MONUC peacekeepers. While ENOUGH's report criticizes the mission for condemning rebel atrocities more often that the Congolese army's equally egregious transgressions, it also identifies the untenable bind in which Kinshasa is forcing MONUC.

[T]he Congolese government has expected MONUC to fight its war against Nkunda, and periodically blamed the UN for failing to dislodge the CNDP. Recent public protests against MONUC are a grim indication that blaming the UN resonates with frustrated and war-weary Congolese civilians. This cynical strategy by the Congolese government of failing to implement agreements while simultaneously blaming the peacekeepers for the eroding situation may well make things much worse.

If only such a "cynical strategy" were limited to DR Congo. UN blue helmets are stationed all over the world in incredibly difficult situations, at times with only skimpy Rules of Engagement and an overly constrictive mandate. Too often they are scapegoated for the failings, deceptions, and aggressions of governments, rebel groups, and, yes, the international community that deployed them. The civilians on the ground, who cannot peer into the back rooms of peace negotiations where promises are made and broken, should not be manipulated as vessels of propaganda. If parties truly have the interests of their people at heart, then they should help peacekeepers keep a peace, rather than use them to try to tear one apart.

Critics of UN peacekeeping often charge that the Security Council is wont to authorize missions before it can be assured that Member States will pony up the requisite troops and equipment. By and large, this is an unfounded accusation, as the Secretary-General's recent recommendation [pdf] for the UN mission in Chad and the Central African Republic (MINURCAT) makes clear:

In order to achieve the required effect, the force should be led by high-quality commanders and provided the necessary capabilities, selected by the United Nations. In this regard, and in accordance with the Brahimi report (S/2000/809), it would be recommended that the Security Council consider leaving in draft form the resolution authorizing the deployment of the force until such time as the Secretariat has firm commitments of troops and other critical mission support elements from Member States.

The 2000 "Brahimi report" that the S-G cites was a major doctrinal moment in UN peacekeeping, as it stipulated that missions should only be undertaken where there is a peace to keep and when they will be provided with the necessary component parts. Crafted in response to the rapid (over)expansion of UN peacekeeping in the mid-90's, the Brahimi report is now facing another significant test, as UN peacekeeping is being looked to in complex conflict zones like Ethiopia/Eritrea, Somalia, and Darfur.

I'm willing to grant that certain logistical and bureaucratic delays on the part of the UN have played a significant role in slowing the deployment of the UN-AU joint peacekeeping force to Darfur. But this? Please.

Sudan's Ambassador Abdalmahmoud Abdalhaleem rejected the idea that Khartoum was at all responsible for delays in deploying the joint U.N.-AU peacekeeping mission (UNAMID). He said his government was doing everything in its power to ensure that the U.N. target was met. Le Roy said he expected that only half of the 26,000 UNAMID peacekeepers would be on the ground in Darfur by the end of the year. "If there are delays, it's because of the United Nations," Abdalhaleem told Reuters, adding that he hoped Le Roy would create better ties with Sudan than his predecessor.

The new UN peacekeeping chief's honest assessment of the deployment rate in Darfur should not be taken as license to blast the UN for not meeting its target. The host government's cooperation -- particularly in the politically contentious and logistically difficult case of Darfur -- is absolutely crucial in securing full deployment of as large and ambitious a peacekeeping force as UNAMID, so it goes without saying that, unless the UN simply isn't trying to deploy, the government in Khartoum bears at least some responsibility for the delays. Of course, when others have claimed that the government has persistently withheld visas, imposed arbitrary and draconian regulations, held up the transport of vital supplies, stolen fuel, and even attacked neutral peacekeepers, it isn't exactly fully committed to facilitating the deployment of a robust international force on its territory. Ambassador Abdalhaleem's statement seems designed to deflect attention from his own government's obstructionism, but it flies in the face of far too many facts to be taken at all seriously.