Africa

Piggybacking on Mark's response to Alex Thurston's disagreement with Ban's report on Somalia, there are a couple of things we must keep in mind. First, the Secretary-General's suggestion of possibly deploying peacekeepers in Somalia (eventually, at least) was not always his idea. As Edith Lederer of the AP reminds us, Ban has previously actually resisted pressure to push for a peacekeeping force.

In December, the Security Council called on Ban to plan for the possible deployment of U.N. peacekeepers to replace the African Union force now in Somalia. The council was reiterating a request it initially made in August that Ban rejected.

Compare Ban's most recent report to the one he gave in November. From Reuters:

"Under the prevailing political and security situation, I believe that the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation cannot be considered a realistic and viable option," Ban said in a report to the Security Council.

Releasing a long-awaited report on Somalia today, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon voiced some degree of optimism in the prospect of achieving peace in the war-torn country.

Assessments and missions carried out by the United Nations have shown that "despite the difficult security situation characterized by indiscriminate killing, kidnapping and hijacking, there is an opportunity to end the prolonged conflict in Somalia and the suffering of its people," Mr. Ban wrote in his latest report.

The report outlines four possible scenarios that could lead to the deployment of 27,000 UN peacekeepers in Somalia, whose instability is currently guarded over by only 2,600 African Union troops (the AP's Edith Lederer provides a particularly accurate run-down of these scenarios). Before celebrating the impending deployment of blue helmets in Somalia, however, one should take a good look at the steps that Ban prescribes as prerequisites for such a force. Particularly key is a significant level of progress that Somalia must make on the political front -- progress that has been unfortunately absent in the country's decade and a half of virtual lawlessness. Ban advises that, in order to avoid the mistakes of 1993 -- when, according to critics, a UN military operation detracted from the UN's political and humanitarian goals -- a peace accord must precede UN deployment. He specifies that at least 70% of the Somali opposition would have to reach an agreement on power-sharing, disarmament, and the renunciation of violence, and would have to accede to the UN's presence. This, too, at the moment at least, seems unfortunately unlikely.

According to Reuters, the EU peacekeeping force in Chad has deployed sufficiently to be termed "operational."

A European Union military force deploying in Chad's eastern borderlands became operational on Monday, starting a one-year mission to protect refugees, civilians and humanitarian operations. The force, called EUFOR, is expected eventually to have 3,700 troops from more than a dozen European countries. France, the former colonial power in Chad, is providing half the troops. "The equipment and units currently available allow us to declare that EUFOR has achieved its initial operational capacity," the EU force said in a statement sent to Reuters.

Even beyond the daunting task of protecting a half million refugees and displaced persons in a still-bubbling war zone, EUFOR faces significant operational challenges. It has already lost one French soldier, killed by the Sudanese military last month. Its neutrality is questioned by both the Sudanese government and Chadian rebels, and Chadian president Idriss Deby welcomes the force, but probably only inasmuch as it seems to provide support for his beleaguered regime. Despite these dangers, the relative speed of EUFOR's deployment -- at least compared to that of the UN force scheduled to deploy in neighboring Darfur over two months ago -- is welcome, and it should bring much-needed relief to those displaced in eastern Chad.

Responding to Mark's post from earlier today... The ICC should not, as Opinio Juris suggests, be considered the "obstacle to peace," at least not per se. It isn't out of sheer haughtiness, of course, that the ICC could make a legitimate case for making Kony's indictment a sticking point. As I've argued previously, peace and justice are deeply interrelated, and a circumscribed role for the ICC in Uganda could harm both these goals and the reputation of the ICC itself. A few points: 1. As perhaps the most deserving poster child for an ICC indictment out there, Kony simply must be held accountable for his crimes. 2. The ICC's charter allows it to suspend its jurisdiction only if the host country's proposed prosecution is fully credible and meets international standards of accountability. While Museveni's proposed use of traditional Ugandan justice seems more legitimate than, say, the kangaroo courts proposed by the Sudanese government to ward off ICC prosecutions there, it is still troublesome that Kony may escape any jail time whatsoever. A free and unpunished Kony will not only insult the ideal of justice, but could very well endanger peace and stability in northern Uganda -- ceasefire or no.

Gloomy news for the prospects of both peace and peacekeepers in Darfur, reports the UN News Center:

Recent fierce fighting in Sudan's devastated Darfur region makes it clear that the international effort to protect the population is at dire risk unless the parties are pressured to negotiate a peace, a top United Nations peacekeeping official said today. "With the Government intent on military action and the rebels either fighting or fragmenting, it is difficult to see an opening for political negotiations," Edmond Mulet, Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, said as he briefed the Security Council on UNAMID, the hybrid African Union-UN force in Darfur.

The opening of an avenue for peace negotiations is, of course, crucial for long-term stability in Darfur. And as long as a peace accord is pursued honestly by all sides -- and not through rushed expediency, as was the failed Darfur Peace Agreement of May 2006 -- it will also improve the odds of deploying a fully effective peacekeeping force in the short-term.

Last week, I wrote on the risk that LRA rebel leaders' insistence on amnesty from prosecution posed for the prospects of peace in northern Uganda. Now it seems that, fortunately, the importance of justice and accountability is not being overlooked. From Reuters:

The International Criminal Court's prosecutor said on Tuesday he would not meet Ugandan rebels who want him to lift indictments against them before they sign a final peace agreement. Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo said in a statement the leaders of the rebel Lord's Resistance Army he has charged can approach the court's judges if they want to challenge his case. "Any LRA legal representative would have to follow the judicial procedures and file applications before the pre-trial chamber," he said, adding he was confident his case was sound.

Moreno-Ocampo's response to this hurdle reminds us that, as important as the ICC's work in bringing perpetrators to justice is, the court also fulfills a crucial role in establishing the rule of law and appropriate legal procedure. Uganda will not be able to fully transition into a phase of reconciliation through procedural shortcuts in the interest of a quick -- but ultimately unsubstantial -- peace.

Next time a detractor calls the UN slow and ineffective, he or she should take a good look at how various UN agencies have sprang to action in Chad. From the UN News Center.

More than 5,500 Chadians who fled fighting in their capital, N'Djamena, earlier this month and have been living in temporary sites in north-eastern Cameroon have now been relocated to a newly equipped camp in the village of Maltam, according to United Nations humanitarian officials. Another 10,000 refugees are expected to be transferred to the camp from the town of Kousseri, which at one point was hosting some 30,000 Chadians -- who left their homeland due to fighting between Government forces and armed opposition groups -- in two temporary sites, as well as in local schools, churches and private homes.

Read the entire article. It is a remarkable display of how a bureaucracy can be marshaled to deliver critical services to a vulnerable population in one of the most remote regions on earth. Not only has UNHCR taken on the burden of relocating many thousands of distressed Chadians, but the World Food program is airlifting food so noone suffers malnutrition and and UNICEF is vaccinating the newly displaced with measles and polio vaccinations. This, I would say, is a good example of UN efficacy.

Conventional wisdom -- here, and elsewhere -- has been that, while President Bush has fallen woefully short in supporting UN peacekeeping in Africa, he has at least done a fairly good job providing humanitarian aid to the continent, particularly in combating HIV/AIDS and malaria. Not so fast, argues Brookings Institution Senior Fellow Homi Kharas; the raw numbers of the Bush administration's aid to Africa look impressive, but a closer look reveals that even these sums pale, in proportional terms, to the amount given by European countries. Moreover, even the aid provided by the U.S. is often subject to bureaucratic delays and does not necessarily go into the areas identified by Africans as the most important. Kharas urges that the U.S. enact an explicit policy to increase the amount of aid it provides for Africa:

The United States can do much more to increase the level and effectiveness of its aid to Africa. It can allocate a greater share of aid to Africa which is the poorest continent and which faces the greatest development challenges. A target of at least 40% - about what the Europeans give - would be reasonable. It can shift resources from food-aid, which has above-market pricing and caters as much to domestic farm interests as to development, towards priority funding for infrastructure, agriculture and economic improvements. In programs like the Millennium Challenge compacts, which do respect local priorities, it should focus heavily on implementation and develop more realistic timeframes so that countries can actually use the promised money. That would be a legacy of assistance that the whole world would welcome.

As I've argued here previously, increasing humanitarian and development aid to Africa is helpful in more than just a feel-good way; by improving the U.S.'s image in the world, it can also actually contribute to a stronger national security policy. An even higher priority, though, is to make sure that the aid being sent is effective; this means, for example, relenting on abstinence-only programs and increasing contributions to concrete development programs -- not to mention anteing up the money for the peacekeepers crucial to the safety of millions of Africans.

Via Hilzoy comes this great bit of news

"With whoops and backslaps, Uganda's government and Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) rebels signed a ceasefire on Saturday, a big step towards a final peace settlement to one of Africa's longest-running wars. "It is the laying down of arms. It is the end of the war," U.N. envoy Joaquim Chissano said after the parties signed the "permanent ceasefire" agreement during their fast-progressing talks in southern Sudan's capital Juba. With only a demobilization deal left to be agreed on, negotiators and mediators like Chissano are predicting a final accord will be reached next week to end one of the world's most macabre and least-understood conflicts.

Fortunately, on UN Plaza last week, I enlisted the help of the Enough Campaign's Julia Spiegel to help me, and viewers, understand the conflict. As she points out, it is actually not that complicated: an outlaw group that receives support from abroad terrorizes the population of northern Uganda. Government forces, in trying to suppress rebellion, commit atrocities of their own. The people of Northern Uganda lose. Until now, that is.