An unnamed American official is non-too-pleased with the Bush administration's moves to normalize relations with Sudan, and so leaks to Helen Cooper documents detailing the entente. The United States, reports Cooper, is offering to take Sudan off the list of state sponsors of terror and take steps to normalize relations if Sudan agrees to cooperate more fully on the deployment of the peacekeeping mission in Darfur. Why would this official think this is such a bad idea? Roger Winter, a former USAID and State Department official with twenty-years experience in Sudan explains: "Given the fact that Khartoum has been involved in negotiations repeatedly over the years regarding Darfur and the comprehensive peace agreements and has signed documents and consistently failed to implement what they've signed, why are we discussing normalization with them?"
I think this is exactly the point. Khartoum has yet to live up to most of the agreements it has signed. The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (which ended a 20 year civil war between the Islamist government in the Khartoum and southern rebels) is on the verge of collapse because the government has decided to unilaterally withdraw from some of its key passages, including on the boundary of the oil-rich Abyei region. The Darfur Peace Agreement was basically dead on arrival--and the government (to this day) routinely violates its obligations contained therein. The President of Sudan, Omar el Bashir has also backed down from personal commitments he has made to the Secretary General to desist from the government's campaign to retard the deployment of UNAMID.
This "is a fool me twice, shame on me" sort of situation. And we've been fooled time and time again. As John Prendergast of the Enough Campaign (and formerly of the NSC) likes to point out, Khartoum tends to respond only under pressure or the threat of pressure. For real progress to take hold in Darfur, the United States should work with the international community to press the government of Sudan to comply with the agreements it has already made--not reward a regime that has consistently failed to live up to its past agreements.
An unnamed American official is non-too-pleased with the Bush administration's moves to normalize relations with Sudan, and so leaks to Helen Cooper documents detailing the entente. The United States, reports Cooper, is offering to take Sudan off the list of state sponsors of terror and take steps to normalize relations if Sudan agrees to cooperate more fully on the deployment of the peacekeeping mission in Darfur. Why would this official think this is such a bad idea? Roger Winter, a former USAID and State Department official with twenty-years experience in Sudan explains: "Given the fact that Khartoum has been involved in negotiations repeatedly over the years regarding Darfur and the comprehensive peace agreements and has signed documents and consistently failed to implement what they've signed, why are we discussing normalization with them?"
I think this is exactly the point. Khartoum has yet to live up to most of the agreements it has signed. The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (which ended a 20 year civil war between the Islamist government in the Khartoum and southern rebels) is on the verge of collapse because the government has decided to unilaterally withdraw from some of its key passages, including on the boundary of the oil-rich Abyei region. The Darfur Peace Agreement was basically dead on arrival--and the government (to this day) routinely violates its obligations contained therein. The President of Sudan, Omar el Bashir has also backed down from personal commitments he has made to the Secretary General to desist from the government's campaign to retard the deployment of UNAMID.
This "is a fool me twice, shame on me" sort of situation. And we've been fooled time and time again. As John Prendergast of the Enough Campaign (and formerly of the NSC) likes to point out, Khartoum tends to respond only under pressure or the threat of pressure. For real progress to take hold in Darfur, the United States should work with the international community to press the government of Sudan to comply with the agreements it has already made--not reward a regime that has consistently failed to live up to its past agreements.
There's a new pro-Israel, pro-Peace lobby on the block called J-Street. Watch the trailer.
I, for one, would hope to see some new life breathed into the Quartet process, which the Secretary General's former representative to the Middle East admitted was just a "side-show." But so long as rejectionist voices dominate the discourse, the Quartet's job as a negotiation-promoting foursome is made much more difficult. Here's hoping J-Street can inject some much needed sanity, compassion, and rationality into the debate.
There's a new pro-Israel, pro-Peace lobby on the block called J-Street. Watch the trailer.
I, for one, would hope to see some new life breathed into the Quartet process, which the Secretary General's former representative to the Middle East admitted was just a "side-show." But so long as rejectionist voices dominate the discourse, the Quartet's job as a negotiation-promoting foursome is made much more difficult. Here's hoping J-Street can inject some much needed sanity, compassion, and rationality into the debate.
Delegates from a State Department designated foreign terrorist organization, the Lord's Resistance Army, have been granted U.S. visas so they can travel to New York to meet the Security Council. Some background: The LRA is a militia that has terrorized the population of northern Uganda for nearly two decades. A peace deal, however, is in the works--and could even be signed by the LRA's notorious leader as early as Thursday. One sticking point in the peace deal are what to do about the International Criminal Court indictments on the LRA's leadership, and the delegates are hoping to press the Security Council to stay those indictments in the interest of peace.
The State Department's decision to grant LRA delegates visas seems to signal that the United States is willing to at least countenance lifting the indictments. This is not entirely unreasonable. One possible solution to the justice v peace dilemma emerging from the peace talks in Northern Uganda, after all, is to exile Kony and his top lieutenants and temporarily lift the indictments in return for full compliance with the peace accord. This solution may make the ICC Prosecutor cringe, but it shows how politically useful these indictments can be as mechanisms to enforce a peace.
Delegates from a State Department designated foreign terrorist organization, the Lord's Resistance Army, have been granted U.S. visas so they can travel to New York to meet the Security Council. Some background: The LRA is a militia that has terrorized the population of northern Uganda for nearly two decades. A peace deal, however, is in the works--and could even be signed by the LRA's notorious leader as early as Thursday. One sticking point in the peace deal are what to do about the International Criminal Court indictments on the LRA's leadership, and the delegates are hoping to press the Security Council to stay those indictments in the interest of peace.
The State Department's decision to grant LRA delegates visas seems to signal that the United States is willing to at least countenance lifting the indictments. This is not entirely unreasonable. One possible solution to the justice v peace dilemma emerging from the peace talks in Northern Uganda, after all, is to exile Kony and his top lieutenants and temporarily lift the indictments in return for full compliance with the peace accord. This solution may make the ICC Prosecutor cringe, but it shows how politically useful these indictments can be as mechanisms to enforce a peace.
Reuters gets its hands on a letter from the US Special Envoy on Sudan Richard Williamson to the Secretary General in which Williamson blames the UN for the slow deployment of UNAMID, the peacekeeping mission to Darfur. This kind of critique tends to infuriate me. The United Nations cannot waive a magic wand to summon the kind of troops and equipment necessary to make UNAMID a success. Rather, it depends on member states to pony up the cash, personnel and equipment. It is incredibly disingenuous to blame the UN for UNAMID's slow deployment when one's government is not offering troops or equipment -- nor even living up to its basic treaty obligation to financially support UN peacekeeping as a whole. (Right now, the United States is $1.4 billion in arrears in the UN peacekeeping account, which is far from chump change considering that the UN’s peacekeeping budget is only $7 billion annually).
Even if the United States does not want to send troops or equipment to Darfur -- which is understandable -- it could still help the situation by using its diplomatic clout to press for peace in Darfur. UNAMID, after all, will only be successful if there is an underlying peace to keep. One obvious way the United States could help politically and diplomatically is to make Darfur a higher priority in its bilateral relationship with China, which has close ties to Sudan. But so far, many in the United States government have found it easier to scapegoat the UN over Darfur than empower it to succeed there.
Reuters gets its hands on a letter from the US Special Envoy on Sudan Richard Williamson to the Secretary General in which Williamson blames the UN for the slow deployment of UNAMID, the peacekeeping mission to Darfur. This kind of critique tends to infuriate me. The United Nations cannot waive a magic wand to summon the kind of troops and equipment necessary to make UNAMID a success. Rather, it depends on member states to pony up the cash, personnel and equipment. It is incredibly disingenuous to blame the UN for UNAMID's slow deployment when one's government is not offering troops or equipment -- nor even living up to its basic treaty obligation to financially support UN peacekeeping as a whole. (Right now, the United States is $1.4 billion in arrears in the UN peacekeeping account, which is far from chump change considering that the UN’s peacekeeping budget is only $7 billion annually).
Even if the United States does not want to send troops or equipment to Darfur -- which is understandable -- it could still help the situation by using its diplomatic clout to press for peace in Darfur. UNAMID, after all, will only be successful if there is an underlying peace to keep. One obvious way the United States could help politically and diplomatically is to make Darfur a higher priority in its bilateral relationship with China, which has close ties to Sudan. But so far, many in the United States government have found it easier to scapegoat the UN over Darfur than empower it to succeed there.
From the UN News Center:
Attacks against aid workers in western Sudan have reached unprecedented levels, jeopardizing vital relief operations in the war-wracked Darfur region, the United Nations Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator said today. In a statement released in Khartoum by her office, Ameerah Haq said the humanitarian community operating in Sudan condemned all acts of violence taking place in Darfur, where rebels have been fighting Government forces and allied militia since 2003. On Monday Mohamed Ali, a driver contracted by the UN World Food Programme (WFP), was shot dead and his assistant was seriously injured by unidentified assailants while traveling on the main route into Nyala, the capital of South Darfur state.Read more.