Responding to a Marty Peretz post mocking the UN for General Assembly elections won by some of his favorite countries, this commenter sounds a welcome note of reality to Peretz's sarcastic jibes:
All well and good, but do you imagine that Ambassador Bolton would have prevented the elections of Libya, Sudan, Algeria, and Iran? It is surely regrettable that the UN does not do what the US would like, but why would one expect that it would? Given that most of the world is governed by regimes for which we have little regard, we can confidently expect that they will take self-serving actions (just as we do) for which we will have little regard.
The UN, in short, is composed of 192 countries. Railing against the world body for the existence of these countries is neither productive nor particularly insightful. Nice to see a TNR commenter call Peretz out on that.
From the stark-raving mad department...John Bolton targetshis Israel's missiles on Iran again. In Boltonland, Iran already has dozens of nuclear weapons pointed at Israel and the United StatesChicago, anything short of pre-emptive warfare is "weakness," and the fact that Iran's presidential elections are tomorrow -- and may actually unseat neocons' favorite whipping boy -- is a reason not for nuance, but for publishing a warmongering op-ed sooner rather than later.
In fact, Bolton crookedly argues that a pre-emptive attack on Iran should actually have occurred under the Bush Administration, which at least did not engage in the kind of "apologetic" outreach that just might undo some of the ill will that a good bombing campaign could generate in the Muslim world. (His answer to the problems that a regional attack on Iran would cause? Unsurprisingly, more bombs!) What is truly unfathomable, though, is that Bolton somehow thinks that we can just attach a nice note of diplomacy alongside the missiles that should rain on Tehran.
Many argue that Israeli military action will cause Iranians to rally in support of the mullahs' regime and plunge the region into political chaos. To the contrary, a strike accompanied by effective public diplomacy could well turn Iran's diverse population against an oppressive regime.
Bomb first, negotiate later.
The other strikingly dense aspect of these two sentences is how utterly -- but unsurprisingly -- Bolton has failed to learn the lessons of Iraq. There is absolutely nothing to back up his blithe assertion that Iranians would most likely "turn against" the regime in the face of an Israeli bombing campaign. The same sort of forecast, equally unsupported by fact, was precipitously used to simply explain away any complicating reactions from Iraqis beyond their relief at the ousting of a tyrant (and one with much, much more blood on his hands than Ahmadinejad). This strategy, of course, proved disastrous in its oversimplification. Millions of Iranians have been rallying during their country's election campaign, but an unprovoked military assault would only sow disorder and antagonism.
It's probably no surprise that AEI's Danielle Pletka would dismiss Obama's speech in Cairo yesterday as mere "jawboning." Her implication, though, is much broader: that basically all efforts at negotiations with nefarious or intransigent actors -- the usual suspects of Iran, North Korea, and Palestine -- are not only wasteful and ineffective "jawboning," but provide a near-treasonous benefit to America's adversaries.
The underlying fallacy of Pletka's argument comes exactly here, in the assumption that negotiation -- the entire act of diplomacy -- is a zero-sum game. No one is arguing that negotiations don't come with trade-offs, or setbacks, or, yes, disingenuousness on the part of one's unsavory interlocutors. But continuing to engage in talks despite these problems is not, as Pletka would have it, to allow these problems to win the day. It is simply giving up.
In fact, Pletka seems more exercised by the medium of diplomacy than of the rotten fruit that she sees it begetting. The question she does not answer, though, is what method besides the "negotiation" and "engagement" that she derides -- and beyond simply giving up talking to other counties -- she would have us employ. Recklessly wielding sticks (or bombs) just limits our options -- and will only make the negative outcomes that she disdains all the more likely.
Obama's Cairo speech, moreover, seems a rather awkward hook on which to hang a denunciation of diplomacy. Obama was not involved in negotiations yesterday; he was making a broad outreach to Muslim populations. This use of "smart power" is a very different exercise than that of negotiating with, say, Hamas. When commentators like Pletka shudder at that latter thought, they are merely misunderstanding both the futility of isolation and the point of "smart power." While Hamas may still rail against Obama's outreach, millions of moderate Muslims heard what the U.S. president had to say. And most of them probably liked it a lot more than what extremists on either side had to say.
In the simmering controversy over U.S.-caused civilian deaths in Afghanistan, Washington has been sending decidedly mixed signals. It has acknowledged that civilian protection must become the top priority for U.S. forces, and, in appointing counter-insurgency acolyte Stanley McChrystal to lead the mission in Afghanistan, has sent the signal that military operations must undergo a top-down shift in strategy and focus. A U.S. military report has even agreed that troops who conducted a particularly devastating air raid in early May committed grave errors that jeopardized civilian lives.
Yet, even as it has castigated its own, the U.S. has still insisted that the Taliban was responsible for the deaths of the 30 (the U.S. number) to 140 (Afghanistan's number) civilians in the raid. (And, for that matter, the continued squabbling over mortality figures, which are consistently lower than either Afghan or UN totals, does not ultimately help the cause of reducing these fatalities.) Even if Taliban fighters did force these civilians to remain in the combat zone, the U.S. military's use of this rationale belies the purported goal of civilian protection: if the primary aim of the operation was to attack the Taliban, then it was not, by definition, to protect civilians.
A stronger critique than the United States' own has come from UN's special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions, Philip Alston, who issued this sharp rebuke:
"The government has failed to effectively investigate and punish lower-ranking soldiers for such deaths, and has not held senior officers responsible," Alston said. "Worse, it has effectively created a zone of impunity for private contractors and civilian intelligence agents by only rarely investigating and prosecuting them."
Actual prosecution is less important than creating an atmosphere of deterrence. All 68,000 American troops that are to be deployed to Afghanistan under President Obama's plan will need to embrace the principle that civilian protection comes first. Criticism from a UN envoy is ultimately less important than negative reactions from those who matter most -- the Afghan people.
(image of a U.S. drone in Afghanistan, from flickr user jamesdale10 under a Creative Commons license)
Well said, from David Miliband, the blogging British Foreign Minister:
Today the latest round of talks on a successor to START finish in Geneva. Last week former US Ambassador to the UN, John Bolton, argued in the New York Times that START negotiations with Russia are no more than "a fast way" for the US to "lose the arms race"
This zero-sum Cold War mentality, that sees US cooperation as a win for Russia, misses the point - cooperation brings gains for both the US and Russia, and it allows them to draw closer together on meeting the real, shared threats they face.
Today's major threats to the US and its allies come not from Russia but from states like North Korea and Iran, and from asymmetric warfare carried out by groups like AQ. Our resources and energy should go into combating these far greater threats. START is right for the new, more joined-up world.
En route to Riyadh, the New York Timesreports that President Obama told a French reporter "United States also could be considered as 'one of the largest Muslim countries in the world.'"
Predicably, this has set off a flury of controversy. Robert Spencer of Jihadwatch, for example, asks "what planet is he on?"
I'm guessing "earth." Because according to the Pew Research Center, there are an estimated 2.35 million Muslims in Amerca. This means that if the United States were a member of the 57 nation Organization of the Islamic Conferences it would rank, in terms of Muslim population, above Albania, Kuwait, Brunei, Benin, Togo, Djbouti, Suriname, Gabon, Gambia, Guyana, Guinea-Bissau, Comoros, Qatar, Lebanon, and the Maldives.
UPDATE: It is also probably worth noting that most Muslims in the United States are not Arab -- and most Arabs in the United States are not Muslim.
The Israelipress is seizing on the line in the Helene Cooper story that Mark discusses that suggests that the Obama Administration might consider "stepping back from America's near-uniform support for Israel in the United Nations if Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel does not agree to a settlement freeze." It's not hard to see why this "could get the attention of the Israeli public," as a quoted administration official opines. But lest anyone get caught up in a tizzy of paranoia that the United States will be "abandoning" Israel to the wolves any time soon, it seems pretty obvious that Israel will remain a major U.S. ally, in the United Nations and out.
Policy-wise, the portrayal of a "threat" here is a ruse: exerting pressure for a settlement freeze will not result in the United States delegation allowing any anti-Semitic or Israel-bashing resolution to go through the UN. I cannot envision a scenario in which the United States will "condition support for Israel," as Ha'aretz scarily forecasts, in any of the Security Council scenarios in which it would need to use a veto. The veto -- or more often, the threat of the veto -- is a step that is used to remove certain language, or when a country cannot convey any support for a resolution whatsoever. The United States will rightly use its veto whenever a resolution attempts to malign Israel or criticize its existence; this rarely if ever happens in the Security Council, but the position is not going to change.
The issue of halting settlement growth is crucial to achieving peace in Israel and Palestine. The Obama Administration has been refreshingly honest in emphasizing this point, but it is not going to throw Israel under the bus over it. Whatever pressure it exerts on Israel to stop building settlements will be related to the issue of settlement construction. If a juvenile attack on Israel's existence is somehow raised in the Security Council, I'm sure the United States will not shy from wielding its veto. To imply otherwise is simply creating a controversy that doesn't exist.
(image of an Israeli settlement in the West Bank, from flickr user Decode Jerusalem under a Creative Commons license)
To the spat over the wording of a UN report on security in Abkhazia, Georgia has added the charge of blackmail.
"It is very unfortunate (and) alarming that the (U.N.) Secretariat submitted to the Russian blackmail," Georgia's U.N. Ambassador, Alexander Lomaia told, Reuters.
This is getting silly. At issue between Russia and Georgia is Abkhazia's national status; it is still an autonomous part of Georgia, but after declaring its sovereignty after the war last August, Abkhazia's independence was recognized by Russia (and Nicaragua). At issue for the UN here, though, is quite simply the status of its observer mission, regardless of what you call where it is stationed.
The geopolitical situation is complicated, contentious, and needs to be resolved, to be sure. But it shouldn't impede on a relatively anodyne report on the current security situation in Abkhazia. The question of wording is tricky, but in not using this report to wade into a Russia-Georgia sovereignty dispute, the UN Secretariat is not being "blackmailed" by Russia. It'd help for both sides to stop levying accusations of bias at the UN and to focus on coming to a meaningful accord over Abkhazia instead.
(image from flickr user openDemocracy under a Creative Commons license)
If the response were coordinated by a global agency, those local officials would not be so empowered. Power would be wielded by officials from nations that are far away and emotionally aloof from ground zero. The institution would have to poll its members, negotiate internal differences and proceed, as all multinationals do, at the pace of the most recalcitrant stragglers.
Brooks has constructed an entirely fatuous false dichotomy: the uniform, heavy-handed, slow, and weak response of a global agency, versus the rapidity, efficiency, and experimentation fostered by multivarious national efforts. The point is not that the response to swine flu can be carried out only through either a centralized or uncentralized response. The WHO coordinates individual countries' responses, making sure that no efforts are ineffective, wasted, or not in line with what must take the form of vigorous international action.
Brooks' mean-spirited (what is "emotionally aloof from ground zero" supposed to imply?) caricature of his WHO stand-in is entirely exaggerated. Far from a plodding bureaucracy struggling to mount a response, WHO has garnered accolades from various quarters for its handling of the situation. And, more importantly, it's the only organization around to fulfill the broad transnational coordination role that's needed in the case of a global pandemic threat.
It doesn't help Brooks' case that he evidently misread international relations giant G. John Ikenberry, whom he cites as the proponent of Brooks' fictional monolithic central response schema. According, at least, to international relations giant G. John Ikenberry (in an email to Dan Drezner):
The problem with David's analysis is that he thinks the two strategies - national and international - are alternatives. We need both. National governments need to strengthen their capacities to monitor and respond. International capacities - at least the sorts that I propose - are meant to reinforce and assist national governments. This international capacity is particularly important in cases where nations have weak capacities to respond on their own or where coordinated action is the only way to tackle the threat. When it comes to transnational threats like health pandemics everyone everywhere is vulnerable to the weakest link (i.e. weakest nation) in the system, and so no nation can be left behind. [emphasis mine]