Non-Proliferation

Judah Grunstein of World Politics Review sees an opportunity for international cooperation on Iran's nuclear program in what would seem to be a pretty fundamental shared interest: making sure that nobody in Iran is exposed to dangerous nuclear material. Citing James Acton at Arms Control Wonk, Grunstein passes on the hypothesis that the surprisingly large amount of enriched uranium reported by the IAEA the other day was due not so much (or not only) to "Iranian deviousness," but also to Iran's reckless disregard for "standard housekeeping" and basic safety precautions. If the fact that Iran has enough nuclear material to produce a weapon is certifiably bad news for its neighbors, then this lackluster care at maintaining safety at its own facility is decidedly ominous for Iranians. And therein lies the opportunity, suggests Grunstein:

[Iran's sloppiness] also, however, might present an opening for a Western consortium to become involved in the Iranian program. That, you'll remember, is one of the proposed compromises for resolving the impasse between the West's desire for transparency and Iran's desire to enrich uranium on its territory. Clearly, the safety of the Esfahan facility is in everyone's interests, and it could become the selling point that allows the Iranians to accept the consortium without losing face.

Well, on its face this premise seems true enough, but I'm rather cynically hesitant to assume that Iran's interest in safety would trump its evidently stubborn persistence to develop nuclear weapons capabilities. After all, if Tehran has not thus far heeded IAEA safety advice (let alone permitted open inspections) in its headlong rush to build a bomb, then why would that prove an effective pressure point for the Western consortium to gain entry? On the other side, I don't think the U.S. government's singular insistence that Iran freeze enrichment will cede much ground to the official interest in ensuring transparency over the issue of preventing nuclear disaster within Iran. Grunstein condedes that the latter would be "icing on the cake," but it seems unclear to me how the international community could bake a cake from the icing down.

With so-so news coming out of Tehran from the UN's chief nuclear inspector, Mohamed El Baradei (Iran's not cooperating very well, but nuclear progress is slowing anyway), Chris Hitchens tells Obama to take his case directly to the Iranian people (though the former may or may not have more pressing issues to deal with in Beirut). Roger Cohen says the Ayatollah's the one to focus attention on. The two propositions are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Acknowledging the Ayatollah as the one truly in charge of Iran's nuclear program is obviously a prerequisite for an effective non-proliferation policy (even if it was somehwat odd, as Michael Crowley notes, that El Baradei's remark that he was "quite impressed" with the Ayatollah's grasp of the nuclear issue directly followed the disapproval he expressed with Iranian intransigence). Not only does this step identify the interlocutor actually pulling the strings, but it refrains from fanning the bluster of extremists like Iran's bellicose President Ahmadinejad. As for communicating with the Iranian people, addressing them in public fora, as Obama in fact already has, is all well and good, but its importance is really more symbolic than anything else. The key for America and other Western nations is not to elbow their way too aggressively into Iranian society and thus be perceived as meddlers by those on the fence about the "Great Satan." Ham-handed efforts to fund Iranian dissident groups, as the United States has an extremely counter-productive habit of doing, will not be as effective as letting ordinary Iranians tire of antagonistic leaders like Ahmadinejad without America exacerbating the situation. (image from flickr user jeffq under a Creative Commons license)

Spencer Ackerman liveblogs from a conference on nuclear proliferation.

Proliferation -- from Russia, North Korea, Iran and the freelance efforts of Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan -- is at "a tipping point" that will be "irreversible, and dangerous beyond the imagination of most people," [Former Defense Secretary William] Perry says. The world has been "moving backwards" on nuclear proliferation, "and each year we have moved ever closer to a nuclear catastrophe." That's why it's time to take what used to be considered drastic action to "move toward the elimination of nuclear weapons." Not reduce, eliminate. "That will not happen until the American government takes a strong leadership position," Perry says, and claims that Obama sees it that way based on campaign statement. Wants Obama to hector the world on nuclear abolition, and "deep cooperation" with Russia on "mitigating the danger of nuclear terrorism." Says it's time to work with the Senate on ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty "12 years after we signed it." Bob Joseph and Eric Edelman, Bush administration officials on the panel, look uncomfortable and whisper something to each other.

A mother gives her own very personal reason for urging the Obama administration to take a step that the United States has thus far failed to take -- signing a treaty banning the extremely deadly weapons known as "cluster bombs."

When the [U.S.] military informed me of [the author's son] Travis' death, they did not tell me that the "explosive device" was a U.S. cluster submunition; men in Travis' unit filled in that blank. It was the first I had heard of cluster bombs. In the ensuing five years, I have learned enough to know that I do not want my country using these weapons to protect me -- or our soldiers. Cluster bombs scatter hundreds of small, unguided explosives over an area as big as several football fields. Usually, some of these small bombs, or submunitions, fail to explode when they hit the ground. These mini-bombs lie in wait like land mines, sometimes for years, unable to distinguish between a soldier and a child.

About 100 countries are gathering in Oslo for another round of signings tomorrow. Having fully exhausted any excuses not to join the ban, the United States will hopefully not miss the next occasion to add its voice of opposition to these horrific weapons.

The diplomacy between the United States and North Korea -- which saw the former "delist" the latter as a state sponsor of terror in exchange for stronger assurances that Pyongyang was halting its nuclear program -- has already resulted in increased access for the UN's nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency. From State Department spokesman Sean McCormack:

"I understand that the IAEA has resumed its work. It has started to reapply seals," he told reporters. "I think, as simply put, the North Koreans have started the reversal of their reversal, so they're getting back to that baseline where they were very close to meeting their obligations under the second phase that we're in, in terms of disablement" of North Korea's nuclear complex, he said.

Just to be clear, a "reversal of [a] reversal" is a very good thing when it means dismantling, instead of developing, nuclear weapons. (Image from flickr user nickwheeleroz under a Creative Commons license.)

Word is, the president will take North Korea off the list of state sponsors of terror as early as today. The Washington Post reports that this move comes on the heels of threats by North Korea to re-start its nuclear facility at Yongbyon, where International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors were barred from entering earlier in the week. Meanwhile, the Secretary General released a new report on the human rights situation in the Democratic People's Republic of North Korea.

Although their veracity could not be independently confirmed, reports from a range of sources continue to cite a high number of public executions. There is allegedly a crackdown on petty economic criminals, whose number has increased owing to the current serious food shortages and difficult living conditions, which have also led to an increase in the number of kkotjebi (homeless children). When forcibly repatriated, nationals who had left the country without State permission continue to face interrogation, mistreatment and sometimes torture, followed by imprisonment and forced labour. Punishment for the family members of defectors has reportedly been used as a deterrent to prevent defection. There have been continued accounts of prisoners being subjected to forced labour, ideological rehabilitation and sometimes torture, many of whom allegedly suffer from malnutrition and chronic diseases. Female prisoners are allegedly subjected to sexual assault and forced abortion. The trafficking of women for the purposes of prostitution and forced marriage also continues to be reported. (emphasis mine)

This probably should not come as a surprise, but it is very disturbing nonetheless. And it is probably fair to say that these kinds of abuses will continue regardless of North Korea's nuclear status or whether or not it is on a State Department list of state sponsors of terror. UPDATE: "No decision has been taken yet," says a State Department spokesperson on the question of removing North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terror. Consultations with the Russian Foreign Minister are pending.

For the second consecutive debate, John McCain responded to a question about a possible Iranian threat by referring to the shadowy concept of a "league of democracies."

I think, joining with our allies and friends in a league of democracies, that we can effectively abridge [Iran's] behavior, and hopefully they would abandon this quest that they are on for nuclear weapons.

There are two parts to this proposed solution: "joining" the hypothetical league, and "effectively abridg[ing]" Iran's nuclear program. The problem with the first step in this process is that the "League of Democracies" is in fact hypothetical. It does not exist, and, as just about every other proposed member country will tell you, it has very little prospect of actually coming to fruition. Even if a coalition of "democratic" countries could somehow be cobbled together, proposing this measure as the solution to the Iranian threat would dangerously delay -- and ultimately undermine -- global efforts to "effectively abridge" Iran's nuclear program. Creating a "League of Democracies" to deter Iran's nuclear ambitions is not just a risky endeavor, because of the lack of international enthusiasm for the idea; even if one could muster enough international consensus to begin the process, it would be a time-consuming project, one for which the United States cannot afford to expend its efforts, particularly when Iran's progress toward nuclear weapons is as dangerous as both candidates agree that it is.

I've been remiss in plugging the excellent new blog by former Citizens for Global Solutions CEO Charles Brown. UnDiplomatic has been a daily read for me since it launched a few weeks ago. Brown brings a wealth of experience from the advocacy community and government. He is closely attuned with the inner-workings of international diplomacy. Brown takes a look at the Administration's decision to rescind the U.S.-Russia Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation, (also called a "123 Agreement"). In the Washington Post, Michael Abramowitz describes the agreement as this:

The civil nuclear agreement was signed in Moscow four months ago, after two years of negotiations. Among other things, the deal would facilitate joint ventures between the Russian and U.S. nuclear industries, and would clear the way for Russia to import thousands of tons of spent nuclear fuel, a business potentially worth billions of dollars.

Not everyone see's the utility of this move. Also from the Washington Post:

Robert J. Einhorn, a specialist on nuclear nonproliferation at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, expressed doubt that withdrawing the nuclear accord would provide much leverage with Moscow, noting that the deal is as much in Washington's interest as Russia's. He said the deal would make it easier for the countries to cooperate in fighting nuclear proliferation and in keeping nuclear material out of the hands of terrorists, both top priorities for the Bush administration.

Finally, Brown explains:

For those not familiar with 123 agreements, they are named after Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, which requires that the U.S. government negotiate and sign an agreement with a given country before commerce in nuclear materials can be established. Although 123 agreements can be controversial in and of themselves (as is the case with the U.S.-India pact), they also offer a way to help promote nonproliferation and the reduction of nuclear stockpiles. The era of U.S.-Russian cooperation on nukes may have just come to an end.