If we accept the fact that UNAMID is a failure, then we need to ask a number of questions as to why. Questions that produce answers that go beyond the obvious point that mandates are too convoluted and that peacekeeping is overstretched, and that produce useful lessons -- for example, for the Security Council as it continues to consider authorizing a UN mission for Somalia.
I will touch on some of these, but first want to make the point that failure implies blame. Should Rodolphe Adada and General Martin Agwai be blamed for UNAMID failure? Obviously not at this point; they cannot be expected to deliver effectively on an ambitious mandate with only a third of their authorized peacekeepers on the ground. UNAMID points not so much to mission failure, but rather to a failure to deploy: To a failed force generation process; to failures in analysis and decision-making -- not in El Fasher, but in New York City; and to the failure of UN member states to pony up what they promised.
Determining the success of a peace operation implies a longitudinal evaluation of where a country such as Cambodia or Mozambique or Sierra Leone is today. It involves a focus not just on the security dimension, but also on aspects of democracy, governance, economy and development.
On the other hand, the multi-functionality of contemporary peace operations and the perceived need to incorporate peace-building aspects as early as possible in the mission, means that longer-term concerns are also pertinent to attempts to determine success in a particular peace operation.
Determining the success of a peace operation implies a longitudinal evaluation of where a country such as Cambodia or Mozambique or Sierra Leone is today. It involves a focus not just on the security dimension, but also on aspects of democracy, governance, economy and development.
On the other hand, the multi-functionality of contemporary peace operations and the perceived need to incorporate peace-building aspects as early as possible in the mission, means that longer-term concerns are also pertinent to attempts to determine success in a particular peace operation.
Mark and Bill make a number of great points. Mark's emphasis on the participation of permanent Council members in missions as both a signal and as a way of avoiding unrealistic mandates is very appealing. But it's interesting to note that one of the missions with most significant great power presence -- UNPROFOR in Bosnia -- was also one of the most disastrous. More broadly, I'd love to hear the input of the group on which ongoing missions have achieved the most in terms of sustainable peace and political development and which have produced the fewest results.
Mark and Bill make a number of great points. Mark's emphasis on the participation of permanent Council members in missions as both a signal and as a way of avoiding unrealistic mandates is very appealing. But it's interesting to note that one of the missions with most significant great power presence -- UNPROFOR in Bosnia -- was also one of the most disastrous. More broadly, I'd love to hear the input of the group on which ongoing missions have achieved the most in terms of sustainable peace and political development and which have produced the fewest results.
Permit me to wade in on both of David's comments and Mark's initial input. Getting the mandate right is like getting the re-entry angle right on Apollo capsules return from the moon: too shallow and they'd skip off into space; too deep and they'd burn up. And they couldn't be steered once re-entry started. Peacemaking and peace accords set the initial "re-entry angle" for peace implementation: too shallow and the polity doesn't recover (Haiti 1994+); too deep and the commitment may burn out (Somalia then, perhaps Afghanistan now). As I tell my students, the international community has the resources for many shallow or a few deep interventions but not both and not in big places. Unlike Apollo, mandates can be steered, but ultimate results may be above their pay grade. Thus, MONUC in DRC evolved from protected observation into a big, violent holding action but its problems will not be solved by whatever the mission might do, even with different nationalities in its troop makeup, because the fundamental problem is higher-grade, in the political leadership decisions of Congo, the surrounding states, and those in Congo who periodically serve as their proxies. The "weight to do right" must be felt in those capitals. Darfur is not even, as yet, a holding action, its fate tied more closely to politics in Khartoum than to whatever peacekeepers might manage to do in the field.
Regarding David's note on the novelty of developed state participation in complex UN ops: it was norm for a few years after the Cold War, with large Western contingents in UNPROFOR (Bosnia -- Britain, France, Spain, the Netherlands, and the Nordics) and UNOSOM II (Somalia -- US, France, Italy, Australia, Belgium). Plus Rwanda (Belgium again). Since then, command and control complaints have been the excuse for non-participation in UN ops but Western hands were all over the control levers in Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda. But the issue of whether UN C2 has improved enough in 15 years is mooted by western commitments of troops under other flags (NATO, EU).
Permit me to wade in on both of David's comments and Mark's initial input. Getting the mandate right is like getting the re-entry angle right on Apollo capsules return from the moon: too shallow and they'd skip off into space; too deep and they'd burn up. And they couldn't be steered once re-entry started. Peacemaking and peace accords set the initial "re-entry angle" for peace implementation: too shallow and the polity doesn't recover (Haiti 1994+); too deep and the commitment may burn out (Somalia then, perhaps Afghanistan now). As I tell my students, the international community has the resources for many shallow or a few deep interventions but not both and not in big places. Unlike Apollo, mandates can be steered, but ultimate results may be above their pay grade. Thus, MONUC in DRC evolved from protected observation into a big, violent holding action but its problems will not be solved by whatever the mission might do, even with different nationalities in its troop makeup, because the fundamental problem is higher-grade, in the political leadership decisions of Congo, the surrounding states, and those in Congo who periodically serve as their proxies. The "weight to do right" must be felt in those capitals. Darfur is not even, as yet, a holding action, its fate tied more closely to politics in Khartoum than to whatever peacekeepers might manage to do in the field.
Regarding David's note on the novelty of developed state participation in complex UN ops: it was norm for a few years after the Cold War, with large Western contingents in UNPROFOR (Bosnia -- Britain, France, Spain, the Netherlands, and the Nordics) and UNOSOM II (Somalia -- US, France, Italy, Australia, Belgium). Plus Rwanda (Belgium again). Since then, command and control complaints have been the excuse for non-participation in UN ops but Western hands were all over the control levers in Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda. But the issue of whether UN C2 has improved enough in 15 years is mooted by western commitments of troops under other flags (NATO, EU).
I agree with Mark that the gap between the Security Council's mandates and what is achievable on the ground has often been startling. In part, this is just hope prevailing over good sense. But it also reflects a deeper reality: when the Security Council authorizes a mission, it may actually be less concerned with the situation on the ground than it is with the political effect of the action at home or vis-a-vis other Council states. This points to an important political role that peacekeeping missions can play: providing political cover for the Great Powers. Historically, peacekeeping evolved in this way and, in a sense, little has changed. The early observer missions to Palestine and then the larger Suez mission in 1956 were explicitly designed to help major powers out of tight spots. Having small states provide troops made sure that the peacekeeping forces didn't themselves become triggers for great power conflict. Obviously, there have been exceptions to the rule that peacekeeping contributors should be small states and "middle powers." (The British have contributed large numbers of troops to several missions, including Cyprus and Bosnia.)
It's important to keep this context in mind, however. In the larger geopolitical game, peacekeeping forces have been buffers between the major powers. Bill Durch suggests that the major powers -- or at least more developed states -- should start providing manpower for the missions. I think he may be right. But we should acknowledge that this would be a significant conceptual shift and that it might involve political complications. The danger of great power conflagration is much reduced, though it will obviously be prudent to keep certain great powers out of certain regions. China has shown increased interest in peacekeeping, and there was grumbling by human rights activists about the participation of Chinese personnel (mainly engineers) in Sudan. The great powers have troops, but they also bring some heavy political baggage.
I agree with Mark that the gap between the Security Council's mandates and what is achievable on the ground has often been startling. In part, this is just hope prevailing over good sense. But it also reflects a deeper reality: when the Security Council authorizes a mission, it may actually be less concerned with the situation on the ground than it is with the political effect of the action at home or vis-a-vis other Council states. This points to an important political role that peacekeeping missions can play: providing political cover for the Great Powers. Historically, peacekeeping evolved in this way and, in a sense, little has changed. The early observer missions to Palestine and then the larger Suez mission in 1956 were explicitly designed to help major powers out of tight spots. Having small states provide troops made sure that the peacekeeping forces didn't themselves become triggers for great power conflict. Obviously, there have been exceptions to the rule that peacekeeping contributors should be small states and "middle powers." (The British have contributed large numbers of troops to several missions, including Cyprus and Bosnia.)
It's important to keep this context in mind, however. In the larger geopolitical game, peacekeeping forces have been buffers between the major powers. Bill Durch suggests that the major powers -- or at least more developed states -- should start providing manpower for the missions. I think he may be right. But we should acknowledge that this would be a significant conceptual shift and that it might involve political complications. The danger of great power conflagration is much reduced, though it will obviously be prudent to keep certain great powers out of certain regions. China has shown increased interest in peacekeeping, and there was grumbling by human rights activists about the participation of Chinese personnel (mainly engineers) in Sudan. The great powers have troops, but they also bring some heavy political baggage.