Mark makes an interesting point—that the proposed mission to Somalia may be the straw that breaks the camels back. Still, it seems as if we are inching ever closer to the authorization of a large peacekeeping force there. My question is this: Can we take it as a given that a mission to Somalia would be as slow to generate forces as UNAMID, and if so, does that mean we should abandon the whole premise of a UN Peacekeeping mission to Somalia? Another way of putting this is: Is promising a peacekeeping mission–then not being able to deliver–a worse outcome than not authorizing the mission in the first place?

Mark makes an interesting point—that the proposed mission to Somalia may be the straw that breaks the camels back. Still, it seems as if we are inching ever closer to the authorization of a large peacekeeping force there. My question is this: Can we take it as a given that a mission to Somalia would be as slow to generate forces as UNAMID, and if so, does that mean we should abandon the whole premise of a UN Peacekeeping mission to Somalia? Another way of putting this is: Is promising a peacekeeping mission–then not being able to deliver–a worse outcome than not authorizing the mission in the first place?