Peacekeeping

Home
Peacekeeping

Peace Clubs in Darfur

This seems like a good idea.
A club for youth to exchange ideas on peace, to be established in all schools of secondary and above levels in Sudan’s strife-torn Darfur region, was launched this weekend, the African Union-United Nations joint peacekeeping operation there (UNAMID) said today. Over 100 new members attended the opening of the first UNAMID Peace Club, sponsored by UNAMID’s Community Outreach Unit, at the Model Secondary School for Girls in El Fasher – the headquarters city for the mission.
Darfur Peace ActivistWhile skeptics might characterize this step as "fluffy" -- and there's no expectation that a "peace club" will end the violence in Darfur -- the reality is that thousands of children have now grown up in sprawling displaced persons camps, relying on international humanitarian aid and unable to venture far out of the camps. And as the tumultuous case of the Kalma camp demonstrates, radicalism thrives where disillusioned and displaced young people have been clustered for years. So rather than nurse resentment, Darfuris now have an opportunity to talk about peace in an open way. It won't quell the very real dangers that a reconstituted Darfuri society will face, but at least it's a start. And even though the club has been organized by UNAMID, it seems to me a little self-indulgent that the first meetings featured a quiz game "in which the students showed off their knowledge of UNAMID and its activities in Darfur." (image from flickr user Samuel Stroube under a Creative Commons license)

Pay Close Attention to this Darfur Crisis

Any day now, the International Criminal Court will issue an arrest warrant for Sudanese President Omar Bashir. In preparation, Sudanese Government troops are massing outside of a town in south Darfur. The only thing standing between 20,000 civilians and the government troops are 196 lightly armed UN/AU peacekeepers. I know people’s eyes sometimes glaze over when they see some combination of the terms “humanitarian catastrophe in Darfur.” But there is real urgency to what is unfolding. It could easily turn into a blood bath in the coming days--which in turn can call into question the credibility of the entire UN/AU peacekeeping effort in Darfur. Here’s the backstory: Muhajiriya is a town in south Dafur which is located at a strategic crossroads that connects some of western Sudan’s main thoroughfares. Until Wednesday the town was held by a Darfur rebel group called the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). The UN, though, negotiated the withdrawal of JEM forces from the town (which were, in any case, no match against the government forces.) By securing the JEM withdrawal, the UN took away the government’s ostensible reason for sacking the town. The peacekeeping mission, UNAMID, is now trying to negotiate a no-fire zone around Muhajiriya. There is a ticking time bomb, though. In the coming days, the International Criminal Court is expected to issue an arrest warrant for Sudanese president Omar al Bashir. When this happens, the town--peacekeepers, civilians and all--may come under attack. The Sudanese troops outside of Muhajiriya are essentially holding 20,000 people in the town hostage; if the ICC warrant comes, the hammer will drop. This is an incredibly tense situation. UN Ambassador Susan Rice had strong words for the Sudanese government yesterday. But advocacy groups like the Enough Project are warning that unless the United States sends Khartoum the clear message that reprisal attacks will not be tolerated, a Srebrenica like situation may unfold. I agree. 20,000 lives hang in the balance.

Waiting for Collateral Damage in Congo

To recap what's going on in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo right now: a Rwandan military force has joined forces with the Congolese army to root out the Hutu militias (many former Interahamwe genocidaires in Rwanda, and now known as the FDLR) in Congo, and in the process arrested Laurent Nkunda, a rebel previously supported by Rwanda. The UN peacekeeping mission, MONUC, was caught unawares by both the incursion and the arrest, and, after first distancing itself from the proceedings, has scrambled to tie together its role as civilian protector and the UN's contribution to peacekeepingmaking efforts in Congo by stipulating that it will not be taking part in the offensive, but will be assisting in planning and providing technical assistance. The problem is, the Rwandan-Congolese anti-FDLR operation is pretty much bound to affect civilians -- and not in the happy liberating kind of way. (It doesn't help, of course, that one faction participating in the hunt is led by the indicted war criminal known as "The Terminator," even though the UN has pledged not to work with him.) This frustrating dynamic has put MONUC in a tight spot. Still, it was a shock for me to read this candid statement from Alan Doss, the UN's head of mission in DR Congo:
"There will be collateral damage, to use that horrible phrase," Doss said. "But again, the international community has pressed for this for a long time now."
Doss is right on both counts. Eliminating FDLR rebels -- the ostensible purpose of the Rwandan-led venture -- is not only something "the international community has pressed for;" it is a necessary step toward securing peace in eastern Congo. But the truth of his first admission -- the reality of the "collateral damage" that is already harming ordinary civilians -- sharply enunciates the awkwardness of MONUC's position. By providing technical assistance to a mission that is necessary but bound to result in civilian death and displacement, yet remaining under its responsibility to protect civilians, MONUC is wavering on an impossible balancing act. There were really no other options available; MONUC could not have stopped Rwanda's advance, even if it had known about it, nor could it not take part in the mission. Unfortunately, no options have led to a not particularly good one. (image of Alan Doss, the Secretary-General's Special Representative in DR Congo)

Nkunda Nabbed

This is surprising news. Congolese Rebel leader Laurent Nkunda was apparently arrested by Rwandan troops on the Rwandan side of the DRC border yesterday. Jeffrey Gettleman has the story:
Gen. Laurent Nkunda, the fearsome Congolese rebel leader whose national ambitions and brutal tactics threatened to destabilize eastern Congo, was arrested Thursday night along the Congolese-Rwandan border, United Nations officials said on Friday. According to the U.N. officials and statements made by the Congolese military, General Nkunda was trying to escape a joint Congolese-Rwandan military offensive that was intended to wipe out several rebel groups terrorizing eastern Congo. He was captured at a small border town called Bunagana after trying to resist Rwandan troops. “He’s going to Kigali,” said Lt. Col. Jean-Paul Dietrich, a U.N. spokesman, referring to Rwanda’s capital. [snip] On Thursday evening, hundreds of Rwandan troops converged on Bunagana, one of General Nkunda’s mountain strongholds. Congolese officials said he refused to be arrested and crossed over into Rwanda, where he was surrounded and taken into custody, apparently without violence.
What makes this all the more surprising is that last month a no-nonsense Security Council "panel of experts" report showed that Nkunda was essentially a front for Rwandan business interests in Eastern Congo. Now, it seems Kigali has turned against him--and rightfully so. Nkunda is quite possibly responsible for war crimes in eastern Congo, including, most recently events surrounding the sacking of Kiwanja. Yet another interesting wrinkle is that earlier this week, Rwandan forces were invited into Eastern Congo by the Congolese government to join in a common offensive against Hutu militias known as the FDLR. It would seem they had another target in mind... France 24 reporter Arnaud Zajtman has more.

Peacekeeping and Expectations

Julia Keyser at the great new Enough Said blog takes on the thorny issue of whether UN peacekeeping "take-overs" help or hurt efforts undertaken by regional missions in conflict zones.
There is ample evidence that UN missions may actually prolong a conflict -- if there is no peace to keep. With Somalia once again facing serious violence and humanitarian crisis, the members of the UN Security Council must remember that UN missions are not a substitute for genuine political will, effective diplomacy and a practical plan to end a conflict.
The question of whether there is something about the dynamic of the actual take-over itself of a mission -- the process of transitioning from the African Union-led efforts in Darfur to the "re-hatted" hybrid operation under UN control, for example -- that improves or diminishes chances of success is clearly subsumed by the broader one of whether any peacekeeping mission is feasible and potentially beneficial in a given conflict scenario. The expectation that the UN will do a "better" job than a regional organization is simply an extension of the misguided belief that cobbling together some sort of peacekeeping force will be a silver bullet for a problem. In cases in which a peacekeeping operation cannot halt conflict on its own -- which is to say, never, though the chart that Julia cites does show that conflicts in which peacekeepers are deployed do reignite less often and take longer to do so than those without -- this perverse international response to crises sets up a predictable double-dip of disappointment. First the world sighs when a beleaguered regional cannot impose peace on a chaotic society (e.g. Somalia); then it chastises the UN when its blue helmets also cannot square the circle of keeping a peace that does not exist. It would save a lot of time, money, and lives to recognize this pattern before precipitously looking to peacekeepers as a one-size-fits-all panacea to any problem.

Which is Deadlier: The Terminator or a Lack of Political Will?

Writing at The Wonk Room, the Enough Project's Maggie Fick cites a recent massacre in the eastern Congolese town of Kiwanja as a particularly stark example of UN peacekeepers failing to protect endangered civilians in the region. Maggie's colleagues, Rebecca Feeley and Colin Thomas-Jensen, describe with horrifying accuracy in Enough's latest report just what happened at Kiwanja:
child kiwanja.jpg
On November 4 and 5, as people all over the world witnessed the historic victory of President-elect Barack Obama, Congolese civilians in Rutshuru territory, North Kivu, were running for their lives... What happened next is a chilling example of what war means for civilians in eastern Congo. the CNDP [rebels] ordered the town's population of roughly 30,000 to leave. However, as the population fled, many men were stopped at CNDP roadblocks and told to return to Kiwanja. Then on November 5, in what is perceived as retaliation for its losses, the CNDP allegedly sought out and killed civilians, particularly young men, it accused of being members of or providing support to the [pro-government] Mai Mai militias. It remains unclear as to how many civilians were executed by the CNDP or caught in the cross-fire, and the CNDP officially denies deliberate attacks against civilians. When confronted by the Enough Project, one CNDP major stated, "Killing civilians is not in our vision." At least 50 civilians were killed on November 4 and 5, and perhaps scores more.
Worse, the rebel leader -- and indicted war criminal -- known as "The Terminator" has been spotted on the scene. What happened in Kiwanja, unfortunately, was not an aberration, and the exacerbation of violence in the region can be traced largely back to the inconsistent and painfully ad hoc ways in which the international community has engaged (or failed to engage) with the problem over the past year. Maggie rightly diagnoses MONUC's struggles as pre-eminently symptoms of flagging international interest and political will, and Feeley and Thomas-Jensen's report provides a welcome critique of the "untenable" situation into which MONUC -- starved of resources, unsupported by serious political initiatives, and expected to perform an expanding role in ever worsening conditions -- has awkwardly been thrust. A "special negotiator" for the region would certainly help, but MONUC will need a lot more support than that to prevent more Kiwanjas. (image of child from Kiwanja camp, from flickr user Julien Harneis under a Creative Commons license)

Underappreciated Peacekeeping

Chris Blattman's ever-interesting blog yesterday featured this chart (from Columbia University statistician and social scientist Andrew Gelman), tracking how long it took for various conflicts -- some with peacekeeping missions, some without -- to return (or not return) to conflict:
peacekeeping chart.png
The information on the graph is a bit hard to take in right away, but study it for a little while, and the implication is clear: conflicts in which peacekeeping missions operated have had a much lower rate of returning to war; and when they do, they usually take longer to reignite. In analyzing these data, Chris plugs the new book by Page Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work?, from which this chart is drawn.
One of the best things about Page's book is that she tries to investigate the (obvious) selection problem that could be driving the result: namely peacekeeping missions tackling the easiest conflicts. It's difficult to measure, but her evidence actually points in the opposite direction: peacekeepers pick the tougher cases. If anything, we may be underestimating the effect of peacekeeping.
Underestimating the effect that peacekeepers have on conflict-riven societies is unfortunately not something new, but this graph quite literally shows why such underappreciation is both unwarranted and contrary to fact.

A New Color Blue in Kosovo

EU flag.jpg
After months of wrangling, the EU mission in Kosovo (known as EULEX) has finally deployed, taking over the police, justice, and customs responsibilities that have been held by the UN for over ten years. Kosovo, of course, declared independence in February 2008, a declaration that has been recognized by some forty-odd countries (including the United States), vehemently rejected by erstwhile sovereign Serbia (and its supporters in Moscow), and accepted by an odd mix of EU countries (excluding, notably, Spain, worried about its own separatist movements). Moving the EU in to ease the UN's transition was long expected and should be praised as a sign of progress. Yet not everyone in Kosovo seems happy about it right now:
Kosovo's Serb minority rejects the EU deployment, as most EU member states supported Kosovo's declaration of independence from Serbia earlier this year. Ethnic Albanians fear that the EU made too many concessions to Serb leaders in a bid to garner their support, and fear that these will lead to Serbia having a say over Kosovo's affairs in areas where Serbs live -- eventually splitting the country along ethnic lines.
I suppose that grudging acceptance was to be expected from both sides, as any tricky compromise in such a tense situation is bound to engender. But the fact that the EU police are there, their flag is flying, and everybody seems calm gives hope yet to the peace process that brought this fellow a Nobel Peace Prize.

Breaking News: Peacekeepers Need Money and Troops to Do Their Jobs Well

Reuters' Louis Charbonneau points to a problem:
U.N. peacekeeping is headed for a crisis, with demand for blue helmets around the world skyrocketing, financial contributions dwindling and reserves of well-trained soldiers drying up.
pker blue helmet.jpg
This shouldn't really come as a shock. UN peacekeeping has expanded exponentially over the past decade, as countries increasingly turn to the UN to stabilize the most unstable areas of the world -- even in places where the lack of a "peace to keep" makes the term "peacekeeper" painfully ironic Even if it's not shocking, Charbonneau's dispatch is a wake-up call. Lest any sort of backlash against UN peacekeeping discourages countries from providing it with the financial support it desperately needs, Max Bergmann voices a reminder of how short-sighted such a policy would be.
"UN forces ... do fail, but this is often the result of either too few troops or too little money," said political analyst Max Bergmann of the National Security Network. "Our reliance on the United Nations to address trouble spots and to prevent them from worsening has only increased," he said. "Shorting the U.N. on peacekeeping funding is therefore akin to shooting ourselves in the foot."
Except by not providing the boots on the ground, or the money for the weapon, there might not even be many peacekeeping feet to shoot.